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Driven by the need to adapt to a changing 
security environment, the Belgian Special 
Forces Group has developed a new gender-
mixed capability in 2020, including female 
soldiers in the operational detachment of the 
unit for the first time. This brief examines the 
development and implementation of the project 
and identifies challenges for future similar 
capacities. It points to the need for clarification 
of tasks and employment conditions, while 
attracting male candidates is necessary to 
maintain the ‘mixed’ character of the 
capability. In conclusion it argues that overall, 
efforts to avoid gender instrumentalization have 
been successful and the creation of the 
capability is a first step in the direction to 
diversify the composition of the Special Forces, 
a step that is necessary to remain relevant in a 





The need to adapt military forces to new hybrid 
threats evolving from complex security 
environments has grown more acute during the 
past decade. In Gray Zones where irregular 
population-centered conflicts may thrive, 
understanding the needs and grievances of the 
local population are pre-requisites for the success 
of any military operation. 1  Driven by these 
security imperatives, the Belgian Special Forces 
Group (SF Gp) developed a new mixed capacity 
in 2020, termed Deep Development Capability 
(DDC), including women in the operational 
detachment of the Belgian Special Forces for the 
first time. The primary aim of the capability is to 
gain a deeper understanding of the human 
environment in which different military 
operations take place, achieve effects, and 
thereby improve mission success.   
 
The DDC is a pilot project for the SF Gp, which 
has been developed over several years before the 
actual recruitment and selection started in 2019.2  
At the end of 2020 the first DDC education cycle 
 
 





was completed and three female soldiers 
integrated the SF Gp while three others were 
included in a pooling system. One male operator 
also followed the DDC specialization course. 
Drawing on observation and extensive interviews 
with key actors, including six of the seven DDC 
members, the Human Domain Advisor 
(HUDAD) and other SF Gp members3   over the 
past year, the aim of this policy brief is double. A 
first objective is to provide an increased 
understanding of the project, its development 
and implementation. A second aim is to identify 
challenges and provide recommendations for 
developments of similar gender-mixed 
capabilities both more widely within the Belgian 
Defense, and in other militaries.   
 
The brief points to the need to clarify the tasks 
and employment conditions for the DDC 
members while reforming the pooling system and 
either widening the recruitment pool beyond the 
SF Gp, or conduct extensive internal strategic 
communication to render the positions more 
attractive to male candidates. Efforts to avoid 
gender instrumentalization, whereby an “added 
burden” is placed on women linked to gender 
stereotypes,4  appear however to have been 
successful. This is partly due to the fact that the 
mixed capability’s core tasks are varied, and partly 
because the adequate training is provided for 
each task required, thereby avoiding any 
assumptions on innate capacities based on 
gender.  It is up to SF Gp’s leaders and members 
to uphold such standards in the future, regardless 
of external or internal pressure to do the contrary.  
 
In conclusion, while there are still lessons to be 
learned, this pilot project has resulted in a much-
needed capability for the Special Forces to 
operate in a complex security environment, while 
demonstrating the importance of diversity for 
broader access and more comprehensive 
analyses.  
 
TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
DDC CONCEPT   
The Belgian defense is facing difficulties to 
recruit and to retain military personnel, a problem 
that is exacerbated by the fact that 40% of the 
military’s current officers will reach retirement 
age in the next five years.5  The SF Gp is not 
immune to this problem, yet while the new 
capacity will open the door for a hitherto 
unexploited pool of recruitment as female 
military staff are selected, 1 the main reason for 
this project is not to be found in numbers, but in 
the need for getting a broader capacity. In 
particular, as one DDC member explains: “there 
is a need for a capacity that can provide a deeper 
understanding of the human environment and 
identify opportunities and threats, as a type of 
‘consultancy’ for the mission”. 6  
 
Such a capacity is clearly best served by a mixed 
team including both male and female members, 
which are able to reach out and access the whole 
population. Early ideas about a Deep 
Development Team (DDT) in the SF Gp unit 
envisioned these teams to be made up of 2-4 
individuals with strong analytical and networking 
skills, including both military members from the 
SF Gp and the Intelligence service, as well as a 
civilian from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,7  yet 
these ideas later evolved into two concepts with 
different gender compositions: the DDT and an 
all-female unit: Female Support Teams (FEMST), 
drawing on US experiences of Female 
Engagement Teams (FET) deployed in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.8 The FEMST was expected 
to work together with the DDT, consisting of 
male operators. While the DDT was supposed to 
move in the nexus of influence operations, 
special operations and intelligence, clarifying the 
famous gray zone, the FEMST were to 
complement all-male teams, by providing access 
to women and children and thereby improve 
 
 





situational awareness,9 which in gender-
segregated and patriarchal societies, can be 
difficult for all-male units.  
 
Such a narrow use of female soldiers has however 
received increased criticism as it fails to take into 
account the fact that gender is not the only factor 
important when connecting with local 
populations, race, nationality or age, may play 
more important roles in some contexts, while the 
uniform may hide or override gender identities in 
others.10 It also risks reinforcing gender 
stereotypes, portraying women as “naturally” able 
to connect to women and children, while 
narrowing down the spectrum of tasks that they 
are allowed to do.11  Internal discussions within 
the SF Gp finally led to the decision to merge the 
two capacities, FEMST and DDT, and thereby 
move away from the narrow focus for the 
FEMST and the two gender segregated units, to 
a broader, mixed capacity: the DDC.  
 
The new capacity incorporated thus elements 
from the earlier ideas: integrating male operators, 
having gone through the specific qualification 
course for SF Gp together with selected female 
soldiers, having completed a Special Forces 
Enabler course, with both groups having 
followed the same tailor-made DDC course. The 
DDC members are supposed to either be 
assigned to already existing units in the field or 
deployed independently before or during 
operations to perform contextual analysis of the 
human environment, identify opportunities and 
threats and ultimately achieve effects: 
 
  “They are the perfect toolbox to 
do certain missions and 
tasks…you are supposed to be 
able to send them in to a theater 
as a pre-positioned element, to lay 
the cards right, to investigate that 
complex domain, that complex 
network, and then come up with 
a couple of proposals of: ‘in this 
environment, if that is what we 
want to achieve, this is all the 
options we have, and this is how 
we can operate in here’.12 
 
In short, the new capability is supposed to be able 
to operate in the whole range of Special Forces’ 
tasks, including Military Assistance, Special 
Reconnaissance and Direct Action, although, 
playing more of an ad hoc task in the latter.  
SELECTION AND TRAINING: GETTING OUT 
OF THE COMFORT ZONE   
In 2019 the SF Gp published the official call for 
candidates within the Belgian Defense, 13 one and 
a half year after the article about FEMST and 
DDT was published in the Belgian Military 
Review and several years after the initial ideas 
about the capability circulated in the unit. Yet, 
even before the official recruitment process for 
the DDC started, members of the SF Gp 
contacted potential candidates informally to gain 
traction for the project. The subsequent call for 
applications evoked considerable interest from 
female soldiers, resulting in 33 applications for 
the three positions, proving not only that a 
significant number of women would like to join a 
unit with an intense deployment schedule, but 
also that they were ready to go through a 
challenging selection and a tough training 
program for, what from the start was thought to 
be just a two – possibly a three-year position with 
the SF Gp.  
 
The call for candidates which specified the need 
for strong language competences, knowledge of 
geopolitics and a high physical level, led many of 
the candidates to prepare both physically and 
mentally, long before the actual selection. While 
most intensified their physical training efforts in 
the months before, some also took additional 
 
 





language and communication courses, studying 
geopolitics extensively in their spare time.14 A first 
selection by the Directorate General for Human 
Resources (DGHR), taking into account the 
opinion by the candidates’ superiors amongst 
other, left only 19 women for the two-week 
selection in December 2019. This drew criticism 
from the Defense Union who contested the way 
this initial selection was made, yet the DGHR 
maintained that it was the normal procedure.15 
After the 19 candidates went through the first 
two weeks of selection, including both a survival 
week in the forest and a range of physical and 
analytical tests, including evaluation of socio- 
emotional skills and reaction to uncertainty, only 
nine women started the tactical enabler course in 
January 2020.  
 
The whole DDC education entails a two-month 
tactical Enabler course, a 16-week specific Deep 
Development course, and another 16 weeks of 
Assisted Operation Deployment. After the 
Enabler course, only six candidates were retained, 
who, together with one male operator started the 
Deep Development course in March.16 The 
Enabler course, which is tailored to the demands 
of the Special Forces, includes traditional military 
training, such as marksmanship, navigation and 
small unit tactics and is highly challenging, both 
physically and mentally, proving that while some 
of the main tasks of the DDC will be more in the 
analytical domain, they should have strong 
military capacities and be able to work 
independently in a wide spectrum of mission 
types.   
 
The second course, the Deep Development 
specialization, is tailor-made to enforce the candidates’ 
strategic, analytical and engagement capacities, with 
courses both by in-house lecturers from the Defense 
and guest lectures by experts from the civilian world 
on topics such as strategy, engagement, and target 
group analysis.17 Most of the classes given during the 
Deep Development course were however created and 
delivered by the SF Gp’s HUDAD who also planned 
and prepared the entirety of the DDC training 
program.18   
 
According to most of the candidates, the hardest part 
of the education was the constant evaluation and the 
absence of feedback on how you were performing:  
 
“You always need to 
perform…and we don’t have a lot of 
feedback, which is hard, because you want 
to position yourself in relation to the 
others… but that is part of the game: not 
knowing, but still performing at your 
highest level”. 19  
 
For some candidates the Enabler course was more 
difficult due to the high demands on physical 
excellence and military tactics: 
 
 “I trained almost two years for it, and I 
sacrificed a lot for it”. 20  
 
While for others, the more analytical specialization 
course was harder:  
 
“It was really intense, we had classes from 
7:30 to 23:00, and your brain is about to 
explode. You need to learn so much, so 
fast”. 21   
 
As COVID-19 interrupted in-class lectures 
during the spring, it was decided to extend the 
training for the DDC members with an additional 
16 weeks of Assisted Operational Deployment in 
the field to get a better understanding of how the 
candidates worked during operations and prove 












PROVING THE UTILITY IN THE FIELD  
 A course certificate was given at the end of the 
specialized course, confirming that the candidates 
had successfully finished that part of the 
education, yet the decision to add an extra 16 
weeks of operational deployment as a type of 
internship was accepted with mixed feelings, as 
the results of the selection thereby were delayed 
another five months. However, the possibility to 
demonstrate the use of the DDC in an ongoing 
operational environment proved to be important 
to gain a broader understanding for the utility of 
the capability, not only for members within the 
SF Gp, but also for members of the Belgian 
Defense more generally, who could see the work 
done in the shape of in-depth studies.  
 
Deployed in teams of two for periods ranging 
between four to six weeks, the DDC members 
joined the ongoing Operation New Nero 
(ONN), 22 in Niger during the second half of 
2020. Whereas each team was expected to 
support the work on the ground more generally, 
they were also given specific tasks to perform 
during their respective period in theater. These 
included perception studies of the local 
population regarding the Belgian Military 
presence, in-depth surveys of the situation of the 
partner force and analysis and recommendations 
regarding existing projects underway within the 
mission. 23   
 
The deployment to a current operation made it 
thus possible to both evaluate the candidates’ 
capacities to function together with other SF Gp 
members in an external environment, while 
producing useful analyses for the mission. 
Whereas these deployments contributed to clarify 
some of the uncertainty about the actual use and 
function of the DDC, which has provoked 
different visions from members both within and 
outside of the SF Gp, it remains one of the 
challenges that needs to be addressed, along with 
the pooling system and how to make the teams 
“mixed”. 
 
IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES: DIVERGENT 
IDEAS OF THE ROLES AND TASKS OF THE 
DDC 
 The fact that the development of the DDC has 
involved several different people at different 
times, has to some extent contributed to a 
confusion over exactly what role the DDC 
should have, who should be part of it, what tasks 
it should perform, and for how long the members 
of the DDC should stay in the unit:   
 
“There are lot of different visions of the 
DDC even within the unit, whereas one 
person told us we would do this, another 
told us we would do that… everyone has 
another view, another perspective…”. 24   
 
Dissecting these challenges, a first problem 
relates to defining the tasks that the DDC should 
perform, and thereby also its training and 
function. For while the current members of the 
DDC have been given a broad education with a 
strong focus on analytical and strategic capacity, 
there have been discussions about using the 
female members for additional tasks that do not 
pertain to the initial description of the DDC 
concept, but where there is a need for female 
militaries. This entails tasks such as bodyguard 
(DAS: Détachment d’Agents de Sécurité) duties 
for female politicians or other VIP such as female 
ambassadors.  
 
While it is clear that there might be an increasing 
operational need for female militaries for these 
tasks, as the number of female ministers and 
ambassadors grows, they do not pertain to the 
DDC training or the DDC concept. Hence, 
whereas some members of the SF Gp see these 
tasks, and the training that goes with them, as part 
of the package when you sign up to be a part of 
 
 





the unit, others maintain that the DDC members 
are not supposed to engage in that type of 
missions. This confusion regarding the exact role 
and the tasks of the DDC is problematic, as there 
is a risk that the female members will be used for 
these tasks only because they happen to be 
women. As there appears to be an operational 
need for more women in the unit to perform 
these tasks, a possible solution would be for 
DDC members to occasionally fill these gaps, 
while the SF Gp recruits more women for these 
additional tasks. However, this should not be 
institutionalized to avoid recruiting more women.  
 
POOLING SYSTEM 
How long the DDC members are to be integrated 
in the SF Gp has been another point of 
discussion. Whereas the idea from the start was 
to recruit three candidates for two years with 
three in a pooling system, this has now been 
extended to three years, possibly longer, 
reflecting thoughts from the DDC members:  
 
“It would be a waste of time and a waste 
of the year we just had to only do the job 
for two years and then go back to our old 
unit”.25   
 
Yet, while there is a logic to this time span in the 
sense that some of the candidates are officers and 
as such need to rotate position every two/three 
years according to the Belgian military career 
system, it also means that there is an enormous 
investment from both organizers and candidates 
in a one-year education program, only to reap the 
benefits of it during a bare two years, and that for 
only three of six competent candidates, as three 
are supposed to be in a pooling system.  
 
The pooling system came up as a solution to keep 
the three candidates that were not selected for the 
unit available for temporary operations and 
replacement when need be. However, already 
before the start of the DDC’s education program, 
there were several question marks regarding its 
logic and feasibility. Firstly, because of the 
seemingly costly exercise of letting six candidates 
follow a one-year tailor-made course, only to let 
three go back to their units afterwards. Secondly, 
because of the difficulty and feasibility of 
belonging to two units at the same time:  
 
“I don’t have the time to combine two 
jobs… you can’t just say to your unit 
that you are going away for three 
months with the SF Gp and then 
come back”.26  
 
Most candidates also voiced concern over losing 
track of what is happening if you are not 
integrated with the rest of the team:  
 
“the DDC is a full-time job. If you are 
not keeping track of what is 
happening, you are losing the feeling 
of everything…you can’t combine two 
jobs and keep two bosses happy”.27   
 
When asking staff in the SF Gp about the 
decision to only keep three of the candidates, 
although six actually completed and passed the 
whole recruitment and training, the answer is that 
they would ideally keep all six, yet only three 
positions for this capability were opened by 
Human Resources. Uncertainty regarding how 
many candidates would actually complete the 
course led to a larger number of individuals 
having terminated the selection and training. 
Making sure that the successful candidates are 
not put in difficult positions where they are 
standing with one foot in each unit should 
however be a priority when drawing lessons and 
improving the current process, not only for 
concern of the individuals affected by the 
decisions, but also in order to retain and recruit 
more candidates in coming years 
 
 





MIXED TEAMS WITHOUT MALE MEMBERS? 
The call for female military members to apply for 
the possibility to join the SF Gp generated 33 
applications from units across the Defense, yet 
only one male operator participated in the DDC 
course, rendering the ‘mixed’ aspect of the teams 
wanting. This operator has nevertheless since 
returned to his original team, which means that 
the DDC currently is made up of only three 
female members, although the capability has six 
positions in theory: three for women, three for 
men. This might not constitute an immediate 
problem for operations in terms of gender 
diversity and access to the population, given that 
the SF Gp operational unit is exclusively made up 
of men with the exception of the DDC members. 
Yet, just as the women taking part of the DDC 
are not instrumentalized as ‘naturally’ capable of 
connecting to local populations and do human 
domain analyses, but given tailor-made training 
to perform these capacities, future male members 
also need adequate education to access and 
connect to target groups. 28   
 
It is understandable that most operators in the SF 
Gp, who have passed the highly demanding Q-
course for the operator position do not want to 
leave their teams and take new courses for 
positions they did not apply for. Yet, it is equally 
clear that: “you can’t make an operator a DDC 
like that, you need those courses”. 29   Ideas within 
the SF Gp for how to mitigate this lack of male 
DDC members include recruiting former 
operators who already have left their teams to 
these positions. However, so far, there still seems 
to be few candidates even within this group, 
which would make either extensive internal 
strategic communication to raise the interest for 
these positions a possible solution, or start 
recruitment outside of the SF Gp. The latter option 
would however require three new positions within 
the unit, a feat which is difficult to accommodate 
with current human resource limits. 
CONCLUSION 
This policy brief has traced the evolution and 
analysed the implementation of a new military 
capability in the SF Gp. It is a topic which merits 
examination and analysis, not only because it 
reflects a deeper reflection on how to counter 
current threats and thereby also may give an 
indication on new directions within the Defense 
more generally, but also because it has entailed 
the inclusion of female soldiers in the SF Gp’s 
operational unit for the first time, thereby 
increasing diversity in its composition. 
 
Diversity is important not only because of the 
visual impact it may have on target populations, 
which, as noted earlier, can be limited depending 
on whether uniforms or other military attribute 
hide the physical appearance or surpass other 
identity markers, but also because people with 
different background have been socialized and 
raised differently. They can thereby add other 
perspectives to analyses, thus broadening the 
understanding. The fact that some of the 
members of the DDC are females is important, 
not only because of the operational demands for 
more diversity, but also because it is opening a 
door into the SF Gp for female militaries who 
have the required capacity and want to deploy 
extensively. Whereas members from the SF Gp 
have insisted that this is not an attempt to 
contribute to gender equality, it will have 
repercussions on gender relations in the Belgian 
Defense more generally.   
 
Several aspects are critical to consider in this 
regard. First, the fact that the SF Gp modified the 
initial idea of creating two gender segregated 
capacities with different tasks, and instead 
developed one mixed capacity. This is important 
because it means that the women are not 
recruited to perform gender stereotypical tasks or 
only represent a different sex to broaden 
accessibility, but rather to add a specific capacity. 
 
 





Second, and related to the previous point, all 
members of the DDC will get adequate training 
to perform these tasks. There is, in other words, 
no assumption that women will be able to access 
local population because they are women, but 
they will receive adequate training for the tasks 
that they are supposed to perform, just as the 
male members. These aspects are critical to avoid 
reinforcing stereotypes in a highly gendered 
environment, and so far the SF Gp has managed 
to steer away from such stereotypes. It remains 
the responsibility of its leaders and members to 
keep it that way.   
 
From a broader perspective, the evolution and 
implementation of the DDC in the SF Gp reflects 
a will to adapt to contemporary challenges in 
order to remain relevant in today’s security 
environments. These are increasingly 
characterized by hybrid threats, such as 
subversion, disinformation and propaganda. 
Such threats are thriving in atmospheres of 
ambiguity, where conventional military responses 
fall short. In order to operate efficiently in such 
contexts, there is clearly a need for a better 
understanding and access to the human domain 
in which they take place. Creating a military  
capacity composed of highly skilled individuals 
who are capable of analyzing, interacting and 
influencing with local counterparts in such an 
environment is an operational necessity. To be 
efficient in understanding a world that is made up 
of people whose identities are intersections of 
gender, age, nationality and race amongst others, 
it will therefore be necessary to deviate from the 
standard military attributes of young, strong, 
white, heterosexual males and recruit more 
broadly.30 The creation of the DDC is a first step 
in this direction. 
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FOOTNOTE 
1 Women are allowed to apply for positions as operators in the Belgian Special Forces Gp, yet so far, no woman has 
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